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By testing the classical correlation violation between two systems, the random number can be
expanded and certified without applying classical statistical method. In this work, we propose a
new random number expansion protocol without entanglement, and the randomness can be guar-
anteed only by the 2-dimension quantum witness violation. Furthermore, we only assume that the
dimensionality of the system used in the protocol has a tight bound, and the whole protocol can
be regarded as a semi-device independent black-box scenario. Comparing with the device indepen-
dent random number expansion protocol based on entanglement, our protocol is much easier to
implement and test.
I. INTRODUCTION
True random numbers have significant applications in
numerical simulation, lottery games, biological systems
and cryptography [1]. More particularly, security of the
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [2] is based on
the random selection of the state preparation and mea-
surement, if the state preparation and measurement are
known by the eavesdropper precisely, she can apply the
man-in-the-middle attack [3] to get all of the secret infor-
mation without being discovered. True random numbers
should be unpredictable for the third party, so most of
true random number generation protocols are based on
unpredictable physical processes [4–11]. Unfortunately,
the true random number generated by these protocols
can only be characterized with the classical statistical
method, such as the Statistical Test Suite from NIST et
al. [12, 13]. Inspired by the device independent quantum
information processing based on non-local correlations of
entanglement particles [14–16], Colbeck et al. [17, 18]
have proposed the true random number generation pro-
tocol based on the GHZ test, Pironio et al. [19, 20] have
proposed the true random number generation protocol
certified by the Bell inequality violation, they also have
given a proof of concept experimental demonstration of
their protocol by approximately one metre distance. The
true random number generation protocol based on entan-
glement, which require no assumption about the internal
working of the device both in two states measurement
sides, thus the true random number can not be gener-
ated with only the classical method, and the random-
ness of their experimental result can only be certified
by the Bell inequality violation. Since the protocol re-
quire the pre-established true random number to select
the measurement basis, it also can be called device inde-
pendent random number expansion protocol correspond-
ingly. Comparing with the random number generation
protocol certified by the classical statistical method, the
device independent random number expansion protocol
offers a new method to quantify unequivocally the ob-
served random numbers.
Both of the two device independent random number
expansion protocols strongly suggest that only entangle-
ment based protocols are suitable for establishing the
quantified true random numbers [17–20]. However, the
entanglement based protocol has much more complicated
experimental setups comparing with the one-way system,
where the first black box prepares an arbitrary quantum
state, sends it to the other black box for performing an
arbitrary measurement. Furthermore, most commerical
true random number generation systems are based on
one-way protocols. Inspired by the method of device-
independent test of the classical and quantum dimen-
sions given by Gallego et al. [21], Pawlowski et al. [22]
have proposed a semi-device independent one-way QKD
protocol with 4 input states and 2 measurement bases,
security of which was based on the 2-dimensional quan-
tum witness and the quantum random access code. Here,
we propose the one-way semi-device independent random
number expansion protocol without entanglement, the
randomness of which can be quantified with 2-dimension
quantum witness, and the experimental demonstration
can be established by combining the commerical QKD
setup with different modulation protocols, the random-
ness of which can be proved in the following section
by applying the numerical calculation method. Similar
to Colbeck and Pironio’s models, our protocol require
no assumption about the internal working of the state
preparation and measurement device, except that the 2-
dimensional quantum system and collective attacks are
bounded. However, we need the quantum state to be pre-
pared and measured in the same safe area, the quantum
state and classical information should not be divulged to
the eavesdropper in the unsafe area.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we give the semi-device independent
random number expansion protocol, where only two
black boxes should be considered. The two black boxes
can be used for illustrating the state preparation and
measurement respectively, detailed scenario can be de-
2picted precisely in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: Semi-device independent random number expansion
protocol. The protocol require the state preparation black
box and the state measurement black box respectively, both
of the two black boxes are in the same safe area.
In the semi-device independent random number expan-
sion protocol, we randomly select four classical input bits
a ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} in the first black box, when pressing
the button a, the first black box will emit the classical or
quantum state ρa, then the prepared state ρa will be sent
to the second black box correspondingly. When pressing
the button y = {0, 1}, the second black box will emit
the measurement outcome b = {0, 1}. We suppose that
only the 2-dimensional system will be considered in this
protocol, that is ρa ∈ C
2.
Formally, we can estimate the probability distribution
by repeating this procedure many times, which can be
illustrated precisely as the following equation,
P (b|ay) = tr(ρaM
b
y), (1)
where, M by is the measurement operator acting on two
dimension Hilbert space with the input parameter y and
the output parameter b by considering the prepared state
ρa. In this protocol, the true random number can be pro-
duced by only considering the date table P (b|ay). More
precisely, we do not require any assumption on how the
probability was obtained with two black boxes, except
that the state preparation and measurement can be guar-
anteed with 2-dimension quantum witness.
We will use the following expectation value to illustrate
the probability distribution for the convenient analysis in
the following section,
Eay = P (b = 0|ay),
P (b = 0|ay) + P (b = 1|ay) = 1,
(2)
where the set of probability distributions Eay can be used
for illustrating the quantum dimension witness. In the
theoretical side, two types of 2-dimension quantum wit-
ness have been proposed [21, 22], we will apply the fol-
lowing tight 2-dimension classical witness in our security
analysis
T ≡ E000 + E001 + E010 − E011
− E100 + E101 − E110 − E111 ≤ 2,
(3)
where we only consider the 4 state preparation and 2
measurement basis case in this inequation. The other
similar expression with 3 state preparation and 2 mea-
surement bases case has also been given in Ref. [21], but
the 2-dimension quantum witness in this case can not be
used for expanding the true random number.
More precisely, the tight 2-dimension quantum witness
can be given as the following inequation (More detailed
information about this inequation can also be found in
Ref. [22])
T ≡ E000 + E001 + E010 − E011
− E100 + E101 − E110 − E111 ≤ 2.828,
(4)
the maximal value of the two-dimension quantum witness
can be calculated numerically. More interestingly, it also
can be analyzed by applying the 2-to-1 quantum random
access code protocol [22, 25], where Alice receives two
uniformly distributed bits and sends the encoded physi-
cal system to Bob, Bob is asked to guess one of Alice’s
bits randomly. This 2-dimension quantum witness is the
main tool to analyze the proposed random number ex-
pansion protocol, and our main result is to establish the
relationship between the randomness of the measurement
outcome and its expected 2-dimension quantum witness
violation.
We quantify the randomness of the measurement out-
come b conditioned on the input values a, y by the min-
entropy [26]
H∞(B|A, Y ) ≡ −log2[maxb,a,yP (b|a, y)]. (5)
From this equation, we can find that the purpose of this
paper is to obtain the upper bound of the conditional
probability distribution P (b|a, y) for a given 2-dimension
quantum witness T . More precisely, the maximal proba-
bility distribution maxb,a,yP (b|a, y) denotes the solution
to the following optimization problem:
maxb,a,yP (b|a, y)
subject to :
E000 + E001 + E010 − E011 − E100 + E101 − E110 − E111 = T
Eay = tr(ρaM
0
y )
(6)
where the optimization is carried arbitrary quantum
states {ρ00, ρ01, ρ10, ρ11} and measurement operators
{M0
0
,M0
1
} defined over 2-dimension Hilbert space. In
the most general case, we should consider the posi-
tive operator valued measure (POVM) {M0
0
,M1
0
} and
{M01 ,M
1
1 }, where M
0
0 + M
1
0 = M
0
1 + M
1
1 = I. Fortu-
nately, Masanes [27] has proved that only the projective
measurement should be considered in case of 2-observable
and 2-measurement outcomes has been considered. Since
T is the linear expression of the probabilities, we can only
consider pure states [21] preparation in our numerical
calculation. Without loss of generality, the state prepa-
ration and measurement in our numerical calculation can
be illustrated precisely with the following equations re-
spectively,
ρa = |ϕ(a)〉〈ϕ(a)|, (7)
3|ϕ(a)〉 =
(
cos( θa
2
)
eiηasin( θa
2
)
)
, (8)
M0
0
=
(
1 0
0 0
)
, (9)
M0
1
=
(
cos2( θ
2
) 1
2
e−iηsin(θ)
1
2
eiηsin(θ) sin2( θ
2
)
)
, (10)
where a ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, 0 ≤ θa, θ ≤ pi, 0 ≤ ηa, η ≤ 2pi.
By applying the maximization problem, we get the min-
entropy bound of the measurement outcome for given 2-
dimension quantum witness T , detailed expression of the
relationship between the 2-dimension quantum witness
and the min-entropy bound can be depicted precisely in
Fig. 2.
FIG. 2: The relationship between the 2-dimension quantum
witness and the the min-entropy bound. The min-entropy
starts at zero in the 2-dimension classical witness case, sys-
tems that violate the 2-dimension quantum witness 2.64 have
a positive min-entropy.
The calculation result shows that if the the violation
of the 2-dimension quantum witness is larger than 2.64,
the semi-device independent true random number can
be expanded correspondingly. The maximal value of the
min-entropy bound in our numerical calculation is 0.206,
which can be satisfied in case of the 2-dimension quantum
witness violation is 2.828.
III. EXAMPLE DESCRIPTION
In this section, we give a particular protocol to illus-
trate the smei-device independent random number ex-
pansion protocol. This protocol is equal to the (2,1,0.85)
quantum random access code protocol [22–25]. In this
particular protocol, the state preparation in the first
black box can be illustrated precisely as the following
equations
|ϕ(00)〉 = cos(pi
8
)|0〉+ sin(pi
8
)|1〉,
|ϕ(01)〉 = cos(7pi
8
)|0〉+ sin(7pi
8
)|1〉,
|ϕ(10)〉 = cos(3pi
8
)|0〉+ sin(3pi
8
)|1〉,
|ϕ(11)〉 = cos(5pi
8
)|0〉+ sin(5pi
8
)|1〉.
(11)
For the state measurement in the second black box, we
will apply the two projective measurements with the fol-
lowing bases
{M0
0
= |0〉〈0|, M1
0
= |1〉〈1|},
{M0
1
= |+〉〈+|, M1
1
= |−〉〈−|}.
(12)
where, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 = − 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). The
2-dimension quantum witness in this protocol is 2.828,
which is the maximal 2-dimension quantum witness vi-
olation. Combining this state preparation and measure-
ment protocol with the true random number extraction
analysis result, we can numerically calculate min-entropy
bound of the expanded random bit is 0.206. Note that we
only need true random numbers a and y to estimate di-
mension witness value, no more random numbers should
be pre-established by two black boxes, thus our random
number expansion protocol only need few random num-
ber seed.
Since the BB84 protocol is also based on the 4 input
states and 2 measurement bases case, one natural ques-
tion is considering whether the BB84 protocol can be
used for generating the true random number in our ran-
domness analysis. Unfortunately, it can not be used for
generating the true random number because of it does
not violate the 2-dimension quantum witness 2.64. More
precisely, the state preparation in the BB84 protocol can
be illustrated as
|ϕ˜(00)〉 = |0〉, |ϕ˜(01)〉 = |−〉,
|ϕ˜(10)〉 = |+〉, |ϕ˜(11)〉 = |1〉,
(13)
the measurement bases are equal to the (2,1,0.85) random
access code case. Then the dimension witness achieves
T = 2, which indicates that no true random number can
be generated by considering the semi-device independent
random number expansion protocol.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have proposed a new true random number expan-
sion protocol in this paper, we can quantify the random-
ness with 2-dimension quantum witness violation, not
based on the classical statistical method.
Comparing with the quantified random number expan-
sion protocol based on entanglement, we give a much
simpler method, and our protocol does not need any en-
tanglement. Unfortunately, since the maximal ratio of
the expanded random number is 0.206, our protocol has
a much lower random number expansion efficiency. How-
ever, since our semi-device independent protocol is much
4easier to implement than the full device independent pro-
tocol based on entanglement, thus the semi independent
protocol will generate much more random numbers than
the full device independent protocol in the same period
of time. It is an open question to discuss if people can
find a much higher efficiency random number expansion
protocol in the future research with the similar method.
Similar to the security analysis given by Pironio et al.
[20], it also will be very interesting to analytically prove
the min-entropy bound by considering the quantum di-
mension witness violation.
Device-independent quantum information has at-
tracted much attentions for its higher level security com-
paring with the protocol based on trusted devices. Com-
bining the semi-device independent random number ex-
pansion protocol with the device independent QKD pro-
tocol, we hope to get a much higher security than the
QKD protocol based solely on some mathematical meth-
ods certified random numbers.
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